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ECHR	 	 	 European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	
ECtHR	 	 	 European	Court	of	Human	Rights	
ECN	 	 	 European	Competition	Network	
EP	 	 	 European	Parliament	
EU	 	 	 European	Union	
GC	 	 	 General	Court	(of	the	European	Union)	
MS		 	 	 European	Union	Member	State(s)	
NCA	 	 	 National	competition	authority	
NCAs	 	 	 National	competition	authorities	
OFT	 	 	 Office	of	Fair	Trading,	UK	
Reg	 	 	 Regulation	
SWP	 	 	 (European	Commission)	Staff	Working	Paper	
TFEU	 	 	 Treaty	on	the	Functioning	of	the	European	Union	
TEU	 	 	 Treaty	on	European	Union	
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The	 diagram	 below	 is	 designed	 to	 show	 the	 interinstitutional	 relationships	 in	 EU	
competition	law	enforcement	and	serves	as	a	framework	for	the	case	studies	in	chapters	3,	
4	 and	 5.	 The	 case	 studies	 relate	 to	 the	 diagonal	 links	 between	 the	 supranational	 and	
national	 levels,	 between	 judicial	 and	 executive	 actors;	 and	 the	 horizontal	 link	 at	 the	
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European	 Commission‐General	 Court/Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union:	
judicial	review	
	
The	 General	 Court	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 is	 responsible	 for	 judicial	 review	 of	 the	
European	Commission’s	competition	decisions.	Under	Article	263	TFEU	an	affected	firm	or	
individual	 may	 apply	 to	 the	 General	 Court	 for	 annulment	 of	 a	 Commission	 decision	



















EU	 courts	 imbue	 the	 Commission	 with	 the	 values	 and	 standards	 it	 should	 use	 in	 its	










Commission‐National	 Competition	 Authorities;	 National	 Competition	 Authorities	
among	themselves:	European	Competition	Network	
	
The	 relationships	 between	 the	 European	 Commission	 and	 NCAs	 and	 NCAs	 amongst	
themselves	are	managed	within	the	European	Competition	Network.	NCAs	are	obliged	to	











Network.	 These	 include	 informing	 each	 other	 when	 opening	 an	 investigation	 or	 before	
adopting	 a	 decision	 (article	 11(3)	 and	 (4)	 respectively).	 The	 case	 allocation	 rules	 are	
based	on	 the	notion	 of	 the	 ‘well	 placed	 to	 act’	 competition	 authority.26	The	Commission	
retains	 the	power	 to	 relieve	an	NCA	of	 its	 competence	by	 initiating	 its	own	proceedings	
                                                 
24 I Atanasiu & C-D Ehlermann ‘The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law: Consequences for the Future 
Role and Function of the EC Courts’ (2002) 23(2) European Competition Law Review 72-80, at 72-3: 
“…direct applicability of Article [101(3) TFEU] will oblige the European courts to switch from the self-
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25 Commission Notice of 27 April 2004 on cooperation within the network of competition authorities, OJ 
C 101, 27.04.2004, 43-53 















of	 courts	 relative	 to	 competition	 authorities	 and	 to	 make	 EU‐wide	 enforcement	 more	







interpretation	 of	 EU	 law	 throughout	 the	 Member	 States,	 is	 the	 preliminary	 reference	
procedure.	Through	the	doctrine	of	direct	effect,	national	courts	are	also	EU	courts.30	The	
CJEU	is	not	involved	in	day‐to‐day	enforcement	of	EU	competition	law,	but	is	the	ultimate	
interpreter	 of	 Articles	 101	 and	 102	 of	 the	 Treaty	 and	 related	 legislation.	 This	 judicial	
relationship	 is	 not	 directly	 affected	 by	 the	 2004	 reforms.	 Several	 commentators	
hypothesised	 that	 decentralised	 enforcement	 would	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 preliminary	
references,31	 but	 it	may	 still	 be	 too	 early	 to	 say	whether	 an	 increase	 has	materialised.32	
                                                 
27 Network notice [54] 
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This	 relationship	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 chapter	 4.	 Article	 6	 Regulation	 1/2003	 explicitly	
provides	that	national	courts	shall	have	the	power	to	apply	Articles	101	and	102	TFEU	in	
their	 entirety.	 Before	 the	 reforms,	 only	 the	 Commission	 was	 empowered	 to	 grant	
exemptions	 under	 Article	 101(3),	 making	 it	 difficult	 for	 national	 courts	 to	 conclusively	
rule	on	a	case.	If	the	national	judge	took	the	view	that	individual	exemption	was	possible	
in	the	case,	s/he	was	meant	to	suspend	the	proceedings	until	the	Commission	had	made	a	
decision,	 whilst	 being	 free	 to	 adopt	 interim	 measures	 in	 the	 meantime.	 Where	 the	
Commission	closed	proceedings	by	 ‘comfort	letter’	to	the	parties	rather	than	by	a	formal	
decision,	the	national	court	was	not	formally	bound	but	had	to	take	that	letter	into	account	
in	 determining	 whether	 the	 agreement	 or	 conduct	 in	 question	 infringed	 what	 is	 now	
Article	101.33		To	minimise	divergence	in	the	decentralised	application	of	Articles	101	and	





national	 court	proceedings.	Member	State	courts	may	ask	 the	European	Commission	 for	
information	 or	 for	 its	 opinion	 on	 questions	 concerning	 the	 application	 of	 the	 EC	









Commission,	 which	 goes	 further	 than	 NCAs’	 obligations	 not	 to	 counter	 an	 existing	
decision.	This	means	that	where	the	Commission	finds	an	infringement,	it	must	be	treated	
                                                 
33 Case 99/79 Lancôme v Etos (1980) ECR 2511 [11] 






















Aspects	of	 this	 relationship	are	discussed	 in	chapter	5.	 It	 is	 important	 to	distinguish	 the	
different	capacities	of	national	courts	in	competition	law	enforcement.	They	may	act	in	a	
public	 enforcement	 role	 as	 a	 designated	 competition	 authority;35	 as	 civil	 courts	 called	
upon	to	apply	the	competition	rules	 in	disputes	between	parties	 in	private	enforcement;	
or	as	appeal	or	review	courts.	The	relationship	between	a	national	competition	authority	
and	 court	within	 the	 same	Member	 State	 is	 largely	 a	matter	 for	 national	 law.	However,	
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36 See e.g. the recent Belgian case of VEBIC, C-439/08 Vlaamse Federatie van Verenigingen van Brood- 
en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) v Raad voor de Mededinging, Minister 
van Economie [2010] ECR I-0000, in which the CJEU found that national law is contrary to EU law if it 
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role	 of	 courts,	 tribunals	 or	 administrative	 agencies,	 Member	 States	 must,	 implicitly	 at	
least,	 consider	 the	 trade‐offs	 identified	 by	 Trebilcock	 and	 Iacobucci23:	
independence/accountability;	 	 expertise/detachment;	 transparency/confidentiality;	
administrative	efficiency/due	process;	predictability/flexibility.	A	Member	State	may	need	
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This	 lends	 weight	 to	 the	 argument	 that	 it	 is	 the	 prosecuting	 authority’s	 decision	 to	
abandon	 proceedings,	 rather	 than	 the	 Commission’s	 competence,	 which	 leads	 to	 the	
termination	 of	 proceedings	 in	 the	 judicial	 branch,	 as	 Brammer	 argues.116	 	 If	 the	




This	 is	 where	 the	 compulsory	 jurisdiction	 criterion	 meets	 the	 Court’s	 findings	 on	
independence.	 If	 the	HCC’s	 decision‐making	 body	was	 not	 sufficiently	 separate	 from	 its	
investigating	secretariat,	it	would	be	difficult	for	the	secretariat	to	“withdraw	its	claim”	in	
its	advisory	role	to	the	HCC	board.		
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Belgium	 Brussels	 Court	 of	
Appeal	(referred	from	








concluded	 10‐yr	 EPA	 for	 beer	
with	 buyer,	 Emond,	 in	 1993.	 4	
yrs	 later	 concluded	 5‐yr	 EPA	 for	
beverages	 other	 than	 beer.	
Brewery	 had	 been	 guarantor	 of	
Emond’s	 bank	 loan,	 penalties	 in	
case	 of	 EPA	 breach.	 Bar	 out	 of	
business	 in	 Sept	 1999;	 Emond	
claimed	brewery	shared	liability.		
Court	decided	relevant	point	was	




to	 its	 de	minimis	 notices86,	 block	
exemption	 notifications87;	 CJEU’s	
Delimitis	on	how	to	assess	market	
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not	 conclusion	 of	 second	
exclusive	 purchasing	 agreement	
for	 beverages	 other	 than	 beer,	
but	 moment	 of	 its	 breach.	
Considering	 Com’s	 notices,	 EPA	
covered	 by	 block	 exemption	
notices	 as	 market	 share	 did	 not	
exceed	30%	(was	not	higher	than	
10‐15%),	non‐compete	clause	no	














society	 protecting	 music	 right‐
holders,	 abused	 dominant	
position	by	tying	grant	of	 licence	
to	 other	 conditions;	 refusing	 to	
give	 reasons	 for	 its	 conditions;	
creating	 entry	 barriers	 by	
unjustifiably	 favouring	 firms	
already	 in	 the	 market	 for	
organisation	of	concerts.		
P&M,	 concert	 organiser	 needed	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 102,	
esp.	 discrimination	 (102(c)),	 of	
collecting	 society’s	 criteria	 for	
granting	 status	 of	 ‘grand	
organisateur’	 entitling	 50%	
rebate	on	royalties.	
					Com	 referred	 to	 its	 decisional	
practice	 in	 sector,	 rehearsing	
factors	 which	 can	 be	 taken	 into	
account	to	assess	whether	criteria	
themselves,	 or	 their	 application,	
4.2.2005	(2)	
3.11.2005	(3)	
                                                 
89 Belgian (non-confidential) judgments from DG Comp national court judgments database:   http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2005_038_be.pdf . 
Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html; http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/sabam.pdf ;  Commission annual report 2005, p. 67-68 





















SABAM.	 Only	 SABAM	 issued	
licences	 in	 Belgium.	 Refused	 to	
grant	 P&M	 status	 of	 ‘grand	
organisateur’,	 denying	 benefit	 of	
50%	 reduced	 tariff.	 P&M	
contested	 bills,	 SABAM	 initiated	
proceedings.	 P&M	 argued	 that			
as	SABAM	was	the	only	operator	
of	 its	 kind	 in	 Belgium,	 market	
entry	difficult.	




unwritten,	 unknown	 in	 advance.	
Excessive	 differential	 between	
tariffs	 paid	 for	 copyright,	 and	
SABAM	 gave	 no	 objective	 or	
economic	 justification.	 Breach	 of	
Art	102.	
may	breach	Art	82.	Com	referred	
to	 Belgian	 as	 well	 as	 EU	
jurisprudence	 on	 dominance.	
Explicitly	 stated	 its	 opinion	 was	
not	binding	and	only	valid	where	
trade	 between	 Member	 States	
likely	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 practices	
alleged.				
	
3.	 Wallonie	 Expo	 v	
FEBIAC	
2004/MR/890	





Commercial	 Court	 did	 not	




organiser	 of	 truck	 exhibition,	
4.2.2005	(2)	
10.11.2005	
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Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/febiac.pdf ; Commission annual report 2005, p. 67 



























capable	 of	 affecting	 trade	
between	Member	States,	Court	of	
Appeal	agreed.	
					Court	 found	 prohibition	 on	
exhibiting	 elsewhere	 within	 6	
mths	 capable	 of	 restricting	
competition.				However,	relevant	
market	 was	 national,	 option	
remained	 for	 exhibitors	 to	
participate	 in	events	abroad.	Not	
81(1)	 unlawful.	 But,	 prohibition	
on	 participation	 in	 another	
exhibition	 in	 the	6	mths	prior	 to	
one	 in	 question	 was	 unjustified	
and	 disproportionate.	 Putting	
that	 clause	 into	 effect	 would	
breach	Art	102.	
	
WEX,	 and	 federation	 of	 truck	
exhibitors,	 importers	 and	
distributors,	 FEBIAC,	 not	 to	 take	
part	 in	 any	 similar	 event	 in	
Belgium	 in	 6	 mths	 prior	 to	 the	
exhib.	
					Belgium	 system	 of	 notification	
of	 agreements	 capable	 of	
restricting	 competition	 on	
national	 market	 under	 Art7(1)	
LPCE.	 Com	 indicated	 fact	 that	
FEBIAC	 regulation	 had	 not	 been	
notified	 to	 Competition	 Council	
had	no	bearing	on	its	legality.	Still	
had	 to	 be	 examined	 under	 Art	
101	
					Recalling	its	decisional	practice	
in	 sector,	 Com	 noted	 it	 had	
generally	 exempted	 prohibition	
clauses	 in	 regulation	 of	 fairs	 and	
exhibs	 on	 basis	 of	 	 101(3),	 but	
exception	 should	 not	 be	 applied	
automatically	 ‐	 needs	 economic	
analysis	 of	 	 real	 and	 potential	
effects	 of	 clause	 on	 market,	
requiring	 delimitation	 of	
geographic	 market,	 and	 assess	






















between	 Art	 101&102	 and	
indicated	 that	 efficiencies	 can	 be	
considered	 in	 Art	 102	
assessments.91	







1995	 where	 ship	 hit	 container	
crane.	 Central	 issue	was	 liability	
of	 pilot	 and	 company	 holding	
concession	 for	 pilot	 services	 in	
Antwerp	port.		
	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 102	 of	
terms	 of	 concession‐holder’s	
pilotage	 contract,	 incl.	 indemnity	
and	exclusion	of	liability	clauses	‐	
whether	 contractual	 exclusion	 of	
liability	is	abuse	of	dom	pos.		
					Com	 laid	 out	 case	 law	 on	
exploitative	 abuses	 and	 unfair	
trading	 conditions	 under	 102(a),	
esp	 BRT	 v	 SABAM.	 Key	 was	
whether	 dominant	 firm	 would	
have	been	able	 to	 impose	similar	




whether	 restrictive	 effects	 of	
contractual	 clause.	 Liability	
2006	
                                                 
91 Commission annual report 2005, p.75 




















clause	 should	 be	 considered	 in	
context	 of	 whole	 contract	 and	
relevant	circumstances.	
5.	Unknown93	 Belgium	 Unknown Unknown applicability	 of	 Articles	 101	 and	
102	to	the	exclusion	of	one	of	the	
members	 of	 a	 standards	 setting	
organisation	
Unknown 2006?	




be	 released	 from	 a	 contractual	
obligation.	
Q:	 whether	 size	 and	 nature	 of	
network	 of	 Spanish	 supplier	
could	 affect	 trade	 between	
Member	 States;	 whether	
exclusive	 supply	 contract	
between	 the	 parties	 could	 be	
exempt	under	101(3).	
					Com	indicated	how	network	of	




                                                 
93 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final, p. 8, and 
accompanying Commission staff working paper SEC(2009)574, Brussels 29.4.2009, p. 80. Investigated available Belgian Competition Authority annual reports 2005-2009 but could 
find no corresponding case.	http://economie.fgov.be/en/entreprises/competition/Belgian_Competition_Authority/Annual_Reports/index.jsp. 2005 and 2006 on French site: 
http://economie.fgov.be/fr/entreprises/concurrence/Autorite_belge_concurrence_Introduction/Conseil_concurrence/index.jsp (accessed 11.8.2010) 




















own	 guidelines	 and	 notices,	 and	
Art	27(4)	notice95	published	in	its	
REPSOL	 investigation96.	 Re	
exemption,	 Com	 simply	 referred	
to	its	101(3)	guidelines.	
7.	Unknown97	 Spain	 Unknown	 Retail	 sale	 of	
automotive	fuel	
Unknown Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 101	 of	
non‐compete	 clause,	 specifically	
resale	 price	 maintenance	 (RPM),	
whether	 agreement	 could	 be	
covered	by	block	 exemption,	 and	
whether	 service	 station	 operator	
could	be	defined	as	an	agent.		
					As	 above,	 Com	 referred	 to	
Delimitis,	 its	 own	 guidelines	 and	
notices,	 and	 the	 Art	 27(4)	 notice	
in	 REPSOL	 on	 assessing	 market	
foreclosure	 and	 individual	
exemption	 under	 81(3).	 Outlined	
criteria	 for	 assessing	 whether	
retailer	is	an	agent	by	referring	to	
2005	
                                                 
95 Article 27(4) Regulation 1/2003: “Where the Commission intends to adopt a decision pursuant to Article 9 [commitments] or Article 10 [finding of inapplicability], it shall publish 
a concise summary of the case and the main content of the commitments or of the proposed course of action. Interested parties may submit their observations within a time limit 
which is fixed by the Commission in its publication and which may not be less than one month. Publication shall have regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the 
protection of their business secrets.” 
96 COMP 38.348 – REPSOL, OJ C 258, 20.10.2004,  7-11  





















					Clauses	 providing	 for	 a	
hardcore	 restriction	 on	 RPM	 are	
void	 if	 not	 part	 of	 a	 genuine	
agency	 contract	 But,	 for	 Court	 to	
decide	whether	 a	 clause	 it	might	
find	 void	 could	 be	 severed	 from	
the	contract	or	whether	it	vitiated	
contract	as	a	whole.	







de	 Girona	 (on	 appeal	
from	 Girona	 Court	 of	




Contracts	 for	 start‐up	 of	 service	
station	 and	 exclusive	 sale	 of	
CEPSA	 products.	 Whether	

















                                                 
98 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/annual_report/2004/aeccr_en.pdf Annual Report on competition 2004 part III: the Application of EC Competition Rules in the 
Member States, pp. 57-58; FIDE 2008 Spain country report (in H F Koeck and M M Karollus (eds) Fide Congress 2008, Vol. 2: The Modernisation of European Competition Law - 
Initial Experiences With Regulation 1/2003 (Nomos / facultas.wuv, 2008), p. 307 lists 5 cases “among others” in which there was a Commission opinion. However, the report gives 


























Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	




Whether	 contract	 was	 re‐sale	
agreement	 or	 a	 genuine	 agency	
agreement.	
Q:	whether	any	Com	proceedings	
related	 to	 BP	 Oil	 contracts;	
whether	 these	 networks	 of	
contracts	 can	 produce	 an	 effect	
on	trade	between	Member	States;	
whether	 such	 agreements	 could	
be	exempted	by	block	exemption	























                                                 
99 Sixth recital of court judgment available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2005_064_es.pdf (included in DG COMP national court judgment 
database) . FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307, reports that the Commission opinion was requested in	Provincial Court Madrid no. 28 and judgment was given on 6.2.2007, but 
actually it was requested in the first instance proceedings. Reference to court judgment in Supplement to Commission’s annual report on competition policy 2005 
































10.	 Grupo	 Texas	 v	
Cepsa	 (case	 no.	 not	
known)100	






















13.	 UAB	 Tew	 Baltija	
Kaunos	 v	
Lithuania	 Vilnius	 District	 Court	
(Vilnius	 Apygardos	
Public	tender Whether	 long‐term	 exclusivity	
would	 allow	 tender	 winner	 to	
Q:	 compatibility	 with	 Art	 106(1)	
&	 Art	 102	 of	 municipality	
14.12.2005	
(3)	
                                                 
100 FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307 
101 FIDE 2008 Spain country report, p. 307 





























Teismas) abuse	 dominant	 position	 by	




carrying	 out	 public	 tender	
procedure	 for	 exclusive	 15	 yr	
waste	collection	contract.		
					Com	 gave	 sectoral	 advice,	
referring	 to	 Art	 102	 waste	
management	 cases	 Københavns	
and	 Dusseldorp,	 and	 Com	 notice	
on	 definition	 of	 relevant	
market104.	 In	Københavns,	 breach	
of	 EC	 competition	 rules	 was	
justified	 under	 Art	 106(2)	
relating	to	public	undertakings.	
					Substantial	 standard	 of	 proof	
for	 finding	 breach	 of	 Art	 102	 or	












Ports Port	 of	 Ystad	 allegedly	 abused	
dominant	 position	 by	 charging	
excessive	prices	for	port	services.	
					Com	 opinion	 took	 similar	
Q:	 definition	 of	 the	 relevant	
market		
										Com	 advised	 should	 define	





                                                 
103 Commission annual report 2005, p. 76-77 (although not named); Lithuanian Competition Council Annual report 2005, English version, p. 25, available at 
http://www.konkuren.lt/en/anual/2005_eng.pdf (accessed 13.8.2010); judgment available from DG COMP national court judgments database (in  Lithuanian) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/court_2006_10_lt.pdf (accessed 17.8.2010) 
104 OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, 1 






















which	had	 ruled	 that	 the	Port	 of	
Trelleborg	 was	 not	 a	 substitute	
as	 this	 would	 increase	 ferry	
operators’	 costs	 and	 reduce	
customer	base.		
not	 other	 ports	were	 substitutes,	
referred	 to	 ECJ	 and	 Commission	





single	 or	 several	 markets.	 CJEU	
previously	 found	 that	
organisation	of	port	activities	in	a	
single	 port	 may	 constitute	 a	
relevant	market.		
Com	 stated	 that	 its	 opinion	 was	
not	 binding,	would	 not	 carry	 out	
independent	 assessment	 of	
market	or	consider	merits	of	case,	
only	 clarify	 criteria	 and	 evidence	
for	determining	relevant	market.	







                                                 
106 Commission annual report 2007 Staff working paper (SWP), p.142-143. F Lindblom, ‘The Swedish Supreme Court asks for the EC Commission’s opinion on the definition of the 
relevant market concerning alleged excessive prices for port services (Port of Ystad)’,  1 March 2007, e-Competitions, n°13747; C Wetter & C J Sundqvist, ‘The Swedish Supreme 
Court declares itself lacking jurisdiction as a result of an arbitration clause (BornholmsTrafikken/Ystad Hamn)’,  19 February 2008, e-Competitions, n°21218. Judgment available on 
Swedish Supreme Court’s website (in Swedish): http://www.hogstadomstolen.se/Domstolar/hogstadomstolen/Avgoranden/2008/2008-02-19%20T%202808-05%20Dom.pdf 
(accessed 17.8.2010) 










































Q:	 notions	 of	 ‘undertaking’;	
whether	 public	 authority	 has	
‘legitimate	 interest’	 for	 purpose	










Com	 notice	 on	 handling	 of	
complaints.	 Court	 found	 street	
lighting	 not	 an	 essential	 facility,	






                                                 
108 Commission annual report 2007 SWP, p.142; FIDE 2010 Sweden country report in G C Rodriguez Iglesias & L Ortiz Blanco (eds) The Judicial Application of Competition Law: 
Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense University, Madrid 2010), p. 32, available at 
http://www.fide2010.eu/multisites/fide2010/templates/yoo_beyond/pdf/suecia/Suecia-2.PDF  (accessed 17.8.2010); A Flood & A Jasper ‘The Swedish Market Court rejects action 
for alleged abuse of dominant position in the electricity sector (Ekfors), 15 November 2007, e-Competitions, n°15760; J Lundström & M Lindgren ‘The Swedish Market Court holds 




































Court	 of	 Appeal	 also	 invited	
Commission	 to	 submit	
observations	under	Art	15(3)	
Q:	 whether	 the	 EU	 competition	
rules	 applied,	 or	 whether	 such	
allocation	 practice	 fell	 within	
specific	 scope	 of	 Reg	 26/62	 on	
application	 of	 competition	 rules	
to	agricultural	products.					
					Com	replied	that	it	appeared	to	
be	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
agricultural	 products	 regulation.	
Court	 followed	 the	 Commission’s	
decision	as	it	had	exclusive	power	
under	Art	 2(2)	 of	 the	 agriculture	
reg	 to	determine	which	practices	
fulfilled	art	2(10)	of	the	reg.	Court	











DD	 Bikes,	 former	 authorised	
dealer	 and	 repairer	 brought	
Q	 Whether	 Ducati’s	 distribution	
system	 could	 benefit	 from	 block	
2009	
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
November 2007, e-Competitions, n°16061. Judgment available on Market Court’s website (in Swedish)  at http://www.marknadsdomstolen.se/avgoranden/avgoranden2007/Dom07-
26.pdf  (accessed 17.8.2010) 
109 Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC competition rules 2005, Netherlands report, p. 22  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/national_reports/netherlands_en.pdf ; Commission annual report 2006 supplement SWP p. 123 (unnamed); T Baumé & S 
Janssen,  ‘The Dutch Court of Appeal of The Hague, after having sought the opinion of the EC Commission, holds that a decision adopted by a mussel farmers association did not 
breach Art. 81.1 EC (Vereniging Productenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Mosselcultuur / Praet en Zonen)’, 24 April 2008, e-Competitions, n°21781); judgment available (in 
Dutch) at www.rechtspraak.nl; FIDE 2008 Netherlands country report, p. 216 


























maintenance) action	 against	 Ducati	 for	 failure	
to	be	admitted	to	network.		
exemption	 reg	 2790/1999	 on	
vertical	restraints.		
Com	 said	 first	 establish	 whether	
there	 is	 separate	 market	 for	
repair	 and	 maintenance,	 as	




exemption	 under	 101(3).	 If	 no	
separate	market,	share	is	likely	to	


















Paper	industry Assessment	 of	 information	
exchange	 relating	 to	 market	
shares	 and	 sales	 volumes	 on	
paper	wholesale	markets.	 Lower	
court	 reduced	 competition	
authority	 fine	 but	 rejected	 the	
substantive	 parts	 of	 the	 appeal.	
Parties	 admitted	 exchanges	 of	
info,	 but	 argued	 they	 did	 not	
breach	 either	 EU	 or	 national	
competition	 law,	 as	 Art	 101	
infringement	 only	 where	 the	
Assessment	 depends	 on	whether	
agreement	by	object	 or	by	effect.	
If	 by	 object,	 no	 need	 to	 consider	
market	 structure.	 If	 by	 effect,	
need	 to	 consider	both	actual	 and	
potential	 effects,	 real	 conditions	
on	the	market.	Detailed	citation	of	
EU	 courts’	 case	 law	 and	 Com	
decisions,	esp	recent	decisions	 in	
paper	cases:	C‐7/95	P	[1998]	ECR	






                                                 



















relevant	 market	 is	 oligopolistic,	
competition	on	the	market	is	not	
sufficient	and	 the	 info	exchanges	
allow	 the	 prediction	 of	
competitors’	 behaviour	 on	 the	
market.	 Qs:	 (1)	 do	 high	
concentration	 and	 oligopolistic	
market	 both	 have	 to	 be	
established	 to	 prove	
infringement	 by	 effect?	Whether	
HHI	 values	 could	 be	 used,	 even	
though	 Com’s	 guidelines	 on	
horizontal	 cooperation	
specifically	 state	 they	 do	 not	
apply	to	info	sharing	agreements	
(para	 10)	 A:	 can	 use	 the	
methodology	 for	 analysis	 of	
market	 structure	 HHI,	 and	
leading	 firm	 concentration	 ratio	
(2)	 Other	 factors?	 (3)	 seeking	
answer	 in	 given	 factual	
Asociación	 de	 Usuarios	 de	
Servicios	Bancarios	 )	 Com	dec	 in	
IV/31.370	&	31.446	OJ	1992	L	68,	
p.	 19	 UK	 Tractor	 Exchange	
Thyssen	 Stahl	 T‐141/94	 [1999]	
ECR	II‐347;	Suiker	Unie	40‐48/73	
[1975]	 ECR	 1663,	 Züchner	 v	
Bayerische	 Vereinsbank	 AG	
172/80	 [1981]	 ECR	 2021.	 Cited	
Com	101(3)	guidelines	on	market	
structure	 para	 25	 OJ	 C	 101.	
DecisiPaper	 markets	 	 27.4.2004,	




Com	 decisions,	 esp	 recent	




                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
112 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 118;  DG COMP national court judgments database (in Lithuanian): A502-34/2009 of 20.11.2009 modifying NCA decision: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/1151910.pdf; A337/2008 of 9.9.2008 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/national_courts/752814.pdf;  
Opinion itself available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/opinion_2002_uab_en.pdf . Supreme Administrative Court of Lithuania annual report 2008 p. 9 (that particular part 
in Lithuanian); Lithuanian Competition Council Annual report 2009, English version http://www.konkuren.lt/en/anual/2009_eng.pdf, p. 14 and p. 15 (accessed 13.8.2010) 
113 As with the Swedish Bornholmstrafiken case, the date of the opinion is uncertain. On its website http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html  the Commission 






















carried	 out	 an	 independent	
assessment	of	these	issues	and	
it	 cannot	 substitute	 the	
analysis	that	the	national	court	
needs	 to	make	on	 the	basis	of	
the	 facts	 and	 information	
before	it.”	(para	48).	
Stora	 Enso/Schneidersöhne	




market	 in	 applying	 Art	 101.	
Degree	 of	 market	 power	 needed	
for	 finding	 infringement	 of	 Art	
101(1)	 less	 than	 for	 finding	
dominance	 under	 Art	 102.	 Com	
merger	 decs	 not	 binding	 on	
application	 of	 antitrust	 rules.	
Advised	caution	on	interpretation	
of	 these	 decisions:	 merger	 and	
Art	101	objectives,	 and	 therefore	













Implications	 of	 Com’s	 REPSOL	
decision	 COMP/38348	 of	
12.4.2006	 –	 whether	 precludes	
NCAs	 and	 courts	 from	 assessing	
whether	 exclusive	 supply	
agreement	 part	 of	 the	
commercial	REPSOL	network	has	
infringed	competition	rules	
Commitment	 decisions,	 but	 oblig	
not	 to	 take	 a	 decision	 running	
counter	 ‐	 in	 practice	 conflicting	
with	 the	 implementation	 of	
commitments	
24.3.2009	(1)	
20.	 Dalphi	 Metal	 Spain	 Juzgado	 de	 lo	 Car	 airbags	 and	 Litigation	 following	 acquisition	 Q1:	Whether	 unilateral	 provision	 2009	(1)	
                                                 



























steering	 wheel	 business.	 Takata	
(competitor,	 minority	 stake	 in	
DME	 and	 shareholding	 in	 all	 3	
DME	 production	 joint	 ventures)	
brought	 action	 against	 DME’s	
production	companies	which	had	
refused	 to	 give	 it	 access	 to	
transfer	 prices	 charged	 to	 DME	
for	certain	products	
of	 info	 to	 competitor	 could	
constitute	 exchange	 of	 info	 –	 A:	
mere	 receipt	 of	 info	 can	 be	 anti‐
competitive	 –	 reduces	
uncertainty	 [in	 effect,	 Com	
advises	in	favour	of	DME]	
Q2:	 exchange	 of	 historical	 data	
does	 not	 influence	 market	
conditions	–	no	infringement.	Info	
more	 than	 1	 year	 old	 can	 be	
historical,	 but	 obsolescence	must	
be	 assessed	 according	 to	 the	
industry	and	market	structure.	




Fils	 SL	 &	 Zero	 Sets	
SL116	
	





Whether	 long	 term	 exclusive	
supply	 contract	 (27yrs+)	
infringes	Art	101	
Assessment	 of	 foreclosure	 in	
context	 of	 overall	 comp	 situation	
and	 economic	 and	 legal	 links	
(referring	to	REPSOL	and	Spanish	
CA	 in	 CEPSA).	 Re	 clauses	 setting	
retail	 price,	 Com’s	 distinguishes	
contracts	according	to	ownership	
and	 degree	 of	 risk,	 in	 identifying	
whether	service	station	merely	an	
agent.	 If	 not	 genuine	 agent	 [see	
2009	
                                                 
115 Commission annual report supplement SWP 2009 p. 118-119; (see also Commission annual report 2010 SWP para 403) 



















cases	 above],	 would	 violate	 Art	
101.	 Art	 5(a)	 vertical	 restraints	
BE	 reg	 2790/1999	 –	 exclusivity	
agreements	 only	 exempt	 if	 mkt	
share	less	than	30%,	if	remaining	
duration	on	1	 Jan	2003	 less	 than	
5	 yrs,	 if	 sold	 by	 buyer	 from	
premises	 owned	 by	 supplier	 or	
rented	 to	 3rd	 parties	 not	
connected	 with	 buyer.	 (i.e.	 by	
agent)	 Conditions	 to	 be	
interpreted	 restrictively	 –	 “do	
not	appear	to	have	been	met	in	
this	 case”	 [Com	 makes	 factual	
finding]	
22.	 Dalphi	 Metal	 (as	
above)117	




















to	 supply	 and	 discriminatory	
practices.		




Re	 assessment	 of	 the	 relevant	
market,	 Com	 stated	 need	 to	
17.12.2009	
(2)	
                                                 
117  Commission annual report 2010SWP  p. 107-8, para [403] 




















assess	 degree	 of	 substitutability	
and	 interchangeability	 of	
products.	 Re	 assessment	 of	
dominant	 position	 Com	 referred	
to	 case‐law	 of	 the	 EU	 courts	 [do	
not	know	which].		
Com	 suggested	 court	 should	
examine	whether	different	
treatment	 by	 dominant	
undertaking	 of	 certain	 partners	
distorts	competition	in	the	








































                                                 
119 K. Alter, ‘Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical 
Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration’ in in A-M. Slaughter, A. Stone Sweet and J.H.H. Weiler 
(eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997),  227-251 
120 Point 1 of the Court notice 
121 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/requests.html (accessed 13.2.2009) 






























                                                 
123 E Gippini Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with 
Regulation 1/2003 (Institutional Report to FIDE Congress 2008) in H F Koeck and M M Karollus (eds) 
FIDE Congress 2008, Vol. 2: The Modernisation of European Competition Law - Initial Experiences 
With Regulation 1/2003 (Nomos / facultas.wuv, 2008), 468 
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126 Commission annual report 2005, 77 
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Competencia 2007, available at: 
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129 2004-MR-7 SABAM contre Productions et Marketing    
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135 Case C-338/95 Wiener v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1997] ECR I-6495, at 18 
136 Case 283/81 CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 3415. Acte 
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140 See A Komninos “Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?” 
(2006) 3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26, 26, who opposes the proposal on the grounds that it would 
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141 Ultimately, if the highest court does not refer the Member State could incur State liability - remedies 
in national courts: C-6/90 Francovich and Others v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357; C-224/01 































                                                 
142 In the national context, the Dutch competition authority’s amicus curiae guidelines acknowledge that 
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144 Supplement to Commission annual report 2005, p. 152-153 
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2006’, 2. Available at 
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84 A Komninos EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC Competition Law by 
National Courts (Hart, 2008) 112-137. L Kjølbye, 'Case C-344/98, Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream' (2002) 






























                                                 
85 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=549&lang=EN 
86 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in 
Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, 
(EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 (‘Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the 
Treaty’) COM(2000) 582 final  - 2000/0243(CNS) OJ 2000 C 365 E/28 
87 Document: 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11.2001; Document: 9999/01 Secretariat to delegations, 
27.6. 2001 (incorporating Document: 9999/01 corrigendum Secretariat to delegations 6. 7.2001) 
88 Document: 13563/01 (Belgian) Presidency to COREPER, 20.11. 2001 
89 Document: 5158/01 Secretariat to delegations, 11.1.2001 
90 Document: 8383/1/02 (Spanish) Presidency to COREPER, 27.5.2002 
91 Document: 13983/02 Working Party to COREPER, 8.11. 2002 
92 Interview with a DG COMP official in the Modernisation working group, Brussels, 19.7.2005 






























                                                 
94 Interview with a DG COMP official in the Modernisation working group, Brussels, 14.9.2005  
95 Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, OJ 2004 C 101/04 
96 Courts notice [13]. See also the scenarios in Komninos (2007), 1404-1422 
97 UK Enterprise Bill explanatory notes 115-EN, in respect of clause 18: findings of infringement [78] 
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmbills/115/2002115.htm  last accessed 
20.8.2012 

































                                                 
99 E Gippini Fournier, ‘The Modernisation of European Competition Law: First Experiences with 
Regulation 1/2003 (Institutional Report to FIDE Congress 2008)’  in H F Koeck and M M Karollus (eds) 
The Modernisation of European Competition Law - Initial Experiences With Regulation 1/2003: 
Proceedings of the FIDE XXIII Congress Linz 2008  vol 2 (Nomos / facultas.wuv, 2008), 121 
100 Masterfoods [46], discussed by Komninos (2007), 1389 
101 Komninos (2007) 1396 
102 Komninos (2007) 1397 




































                                                 
104 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199 [12]-[20] 
105 Courts Notice recital 12 
































                                                 
107 Whitbread [1999] OJ L 88/26 dated 24 February 1999,  recital 127. Commission Decision of 24 
February 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Case No IV/35.079/F3 - 
Whitbread) (notified under document number C(1999) 346) 
108 Crehan HL [69] 






























                                                 
110 Case T-266/97 Vlaamse Televisie Maatschappij NV v Commission [1999] ECR II-2329 [151]. This 
judgment does not mention Masterfoods directly but follows the Suiker Unie case [1975]. The 
Commission cites the case in the Staff Working Paper accompanying the White Paper  [140] 
111 There are also cases in which Commission statements falling short of a final decision have persuasive 
effect on courts, such as Postbank and Synthetic Rubber/ENI, in which the Commission’s statement of 
objections was relied upon by claimants – see A Bouquet ‘Institutional Report’ in G C Rodriguez Iglesias 
& L Ortiz Blanco (eds) The Judicial Application of Competition Law: Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV 
Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense 
University, Madrid 2010),  42-43; Truli, 797 
Chapter 4 of this thesis also dealt with the possible legal effects of Commission pronouncements short of 
a decision, such as opinions in court proceedings.   
112 Case 14/68 Walt Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR 1 






















                                                 
114 “Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full 
mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.  
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.  
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure 
which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives.” 
115 “Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment 
of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the 
Community. They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty.” 
116 J Temple Lang 'The Duties of National Authorities under Community Constitutional Law' (1998) 23 
European Law Review 109 
117 E.g. Case 42/82 France v Commission [1983] ECR 1013 (Italian wine)). See S Brammer Co-operation 
Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Hart, 2009), 422 for 
further discussion 
118 K Lenaerts and D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: Judges in the Frontline’, (2004) 
27(3) World Competition 313-349, 331-332 
119 J Temple Lang ‘The Duties of Co-operation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10EC – 































                                                 
120 A Komninos “Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: Complement? Overlap?” (2006) 
3(1) Competition Law Review 5-26, 25. I make a similar point above concerning the Masterfoods rule 
and national courts as EU courts. 
121 J Temple Lang ‘The Duties of Co-operation of National Authorities and Courts under Article 10EC – 
Two More Reflections’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 84-93 
122 S Brammer Co-operation Between National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC 
Competition Law’ (Hart 2009) , 432  drawing from AG van Gerven in C-128/92 H J Banks & Co Ltd v 
British Coal Corporation [1994] ECR I-1209 (cited in Court of Appeal Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub 
Company CPC [2004] EWCA Civ 637). Brammer also limits the categories of decision to prohibition and 
fining, excluding non-action and commitment decisions.   
123 Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 































                                                 
124 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty, 
Commission Programme No 99/027, Brussels, 28.04.1999. Summary of responses at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/wp_on_modernisation/summary_observations.html (last 
accessed 16.8.2012) 
125 Addleshaw Goddard response to White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules 
COM (2008) 165, 2.4.2008; see also UK Competition Law Association; AFEC, Association Française 
d'Etude de la Concurrence; APDC Association des Avocats Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence; 
Slaughter & May responses  making similar points 
126 C-7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I-1935 [21] 



































                                                 
128 M Danov Jurisdiction and Judgments in Relation to EU Competition Law Claims (Hart, 2010), 130. 
See also K Wright book review (2012) 37(3) European Law Review 355-358 
129 Danov, 131, 281-282 






























                                                 
131 Danov, 123 





























                                                 
133 The different standards among NCAs, particularly different levels of resources and experience, was a 
consideration leading up to the 2004 reforms. This was one reason for the European Commission building 
in the ability to take over a case under Art 11(6) Reg 1/2003, and the reference in Art 35 Reg 1/2003 to 
Member States designating competition authorities “in such a way that the provisions of this regulation 
are effectively complied with”. Source: interview with a DG COMP official from the ECN unit 
13.7.2006) 
134 On trust in the ECN, see H Kassim and K Wright ‘The European Competition Network: a Regulatory 
Network with a Difference’ Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) 
Standing Group on Regulatory Governance Third Biennial Conference, Dublin, 17-19 June 2010 
reporting the results of interviews with NCA officials working in the ECN; Interview with a DG COMP 
official from the ECN unit 13.7.2006. 
135 See the previous chapter  
































                                                 
137 To notify the Commission and other Member States at the opening of the first investigative procedure 
11(3), and 30 days before the adoption of a decision requiring that an infringement be brought to an end, 
accepting commitments, or withdrawing the benefit of a block exemption (11(4)) 
138 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities OJ C 101, 
27.4.2004, 43-53 [5]. The Notice sets out rules for case allocation, cooperation and consistent application 
of the EU antitrust rules between Member States’ competition authorities and the Directorate General for 
Competition of the European Commission. 
139 Network Notice [22] 
140 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/others/wp_on_modernisation/summary_observations.html 





























                                                 
141 Notice on co-operation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C101/43 
142 Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the 
implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty and amending 
Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 2988/74, (EEC) No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 
(“Regulation implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty”), COM (2000) 582 final - 2000/0243 (CNS), 
[2000] OJ C 365E/284, 16-17 
143 These are: requiring that an infringement be brought to an end; ordering interim measures; accepting 
commitments; imposing fines, periodic penalty payments or any other penalty provided for in their 
national law. The Commission’s staff working paper [152]-[153] explicitly gives Art 5 Reg 1/2003 as a 

































                                                 
144 see Commission staff working paper accompanying the report on functioning of Reg 1 SEC (2009) 
574, p. 36 
145 This is based on the notion of the ‘well-placed to act’ authority: [5]-[15] of the Network Notice 
146 C-453/00 Kuehne & Heitz [2004] ECR I-837 concerned the obligation to re-examine final 
administrative decisions adopted in violation of subsequent EU law and confirmed by a national court. 




































                                                 
147 Case 33/76 Rewe Zentralfinanz eG v Landwirtschaftskammer fur das Saarland [1976]  ECR 1989 
148 ‘Private actions in competition law: effective redress for consumers and business: recommendations 
from the Office of Fair Trading’, OFT916resp, November 2007, p.41, [10.6]-[10.7]. 
149 OFT recommendations [10.7] 
150 OFT recommendations [12.6]-[12.7] This apparently contradictory position is a source of confusion – 




























                                                                                                                                               
but Allen & Overy, among others “urge[s] adopting a similar approach to that in the OFT’s 
Recommendations, requiring national courts to have regard to decisions of NCAs without being bound to 
follow them.” 
151 W Van Gerven, ‘Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures’ (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 501-
536, 534; the Nederlandse Raad voor de rechtspraak, Dutch Council for the Judiciary also makes this 
point in its response to the White Paper 
152 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
















                                                 
153 Ashurst report: ‘Study on the conditions of claims for damages in case of infringement of EC 
competition rules’ Comparative report prepared by Denis Waelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-
Shoshan, 31 August 2004, including national reports, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html  
154 16 Member States’ reports were available as at 20.7.2010, at: 
http://www.fide2010.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=58&Itemid=71&lang=en, 
accessed 20.7.2010. Now published as G C Rodriguez Iglesias & L Ortiz Blanco (eds) ‘The Judicial 
Application of Competition Law’ Proceedings of the FIDE XXIV Congress Madrid 2010 Vol 2 (Servicio 
de Publicaciones de la Facultad de Derecho, Complutense University, Madrid 2010). Questions 9, 10, 11, 
12, 13, 15 are relevant: e.g. Q9: ‘Has the national court to stay its proceedings once the national 
competition authority (NCA) has initiated proceedings on the same matter, until a decision has been 
reached?’. Q10: ‘Has the NCA to stay its proceedings once a national court has initiated proceedings on 
the same matter, until a decisions has been reached?’, Q11: ‘Are national courts bound by the final 
decisions adopted by a NCA declaring that a certain practice amounts to an infringement? Is the response 
the same where the NCA rules that the practice does not infringe competition law?’, Q12: ‘Is the NCA 
bound by the final decisions adopted by a national court declaring that a certain practice amounts to an 
infringement? Is the response the same where the national court rules that the practice does not infringe 
competition law?’, Q13: ‘If not [see Q12], what is the value for a national court of a final decision 





























                                                                                                                                               
by administrative decisions – as provided for in Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 in respect to the 
Commission’s decisions? In the absence of a specific legal provision such as Article 16… what is or 
could be the value for a national court of a final decision adopted by a NCA of [an]other Member State? 
And of a judgment of the court of another Member State?’ 
155 This may also reflect the difference between law in statute and court practice, and changes in 
legislation. 
156 See Ashurst Study, 69 
157 See the independent study prepared by Lear for the European Parliament’s Economic and Monetary 























                                                 
158 The Lear study for the European Parliament, p. 25, claims that Sweden also allows for binding effect 
of foreign NCA decisions, but gives no precise source. The FIDE 2010 report explains that such a 
proposal would be against the Swedish Constitution according to the Instrument of Government Section 
11:2 and 11:7: “[n]o public authority, including the Swedish Parliament, may determine how a court of 
law is to adjudicate an individual case or otherwise apply a rule of law in a particular case”. (The 
Instrument of Government, Section 11:2). Similarly, “[n]o public authority may determine how an 
administrative authority is to decide in a particular case involving the exercise of public authority vis-à-
vis a private subject or a local authority, or the application of law”(The Instrument of Government, 
Section 11:7).. Consequently, the proposal in the White Paper as regards the binding effect of National 
Competition Authorities’ decisions upon the judiciary are incompatible with the Swedish Constitution, 
and would thus require a constitutional reform to be implemented in Sweden.” 
159 “Where damages are claimed for an infringement of a provision of this Act or of Article 81 or 82 of 
the EC Treaty, the court shall be bound by a finding that an infringement has occurred, to the extent such 
a finding was made in a final decision by the cartel authority, the Commission of the European 
Community, or the competition authority - or court acting as such - in another Member State of the 
European Community. The same applies to such findings in final judgments resulting from appeals 
against decisions pursuant to sentence 1. Pursuant to Article 16(1), sentence 4 of Regulation (EC) No. 
1/2003 this obligation applies without prejudice to the rights and obligations under Article 234 of the EC 
Treaty.”  7th Amendment 2005 of the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, (GWB). English 
version available at 
http://www.bundeskartellamt.de/wEnglisch/download/pdf/GWB/0911_GWB_7_Novelle_E.pdf . The 
most recent 8th Amendment was adopted in March 2012.  
160 Informally confirmed by S Peyer 
161 W Wurmnest ‘A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the 































                                                 
162 FIDE 2010 proceedings 
163 FIDE 2010 proceedings 
164 Ashurst study, 69-70 
165 Introduced by section 20 of the UK Enterprise Act 2002 
166 Limitation periods in subsection (4) 
167 C Brown and D Ryan, UK country report for FIDE Congress 2010, available at 
































                                                 
168 [2009] EWCA Civ 647. On 1 July 2009, the Court of Appeal upheld an appeal against a judgment of 
the CAT by English Welsh & Scottish Railway Limited (EWS) that partly refused an application by EWS 
to strike out part of the damages claim brought by Enron Coal Services Limited. 
169 Enron [31] 



























                                                 
171 Ashurst Study, 69-70. However, according to the FIDE Portugal country report 2010, “A final decision 
adopted by an NCA, with the same value than a judgment in the country where it was issued, must be 
considered by the Portuguese Courts as if it was a decision from a foreign court.” (response to Q15). This 
raises the question of whether decisions from Member States with courts designated as competition 
authorities (e.g. Ireland) would be favoured. 
172 FIDE 2010 country report 
173 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/white_paper_comments.html .  
174 Very few judges or courts made direct representations to the White Paper consultation. Exceptions 
were the Association of European Competition Law Judges (AECLJ) and the Italian Supreme Court. It 
was a similar situation in the context of the 2004 reforms: one judge noted that German judges took no 
active part in the discussions. The principals were the European Commission, Bundeskartellamt, 
Monopolkommission and academics – comment of  J Gröning in C-D Ehlermann (ed) European 
Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy (Hart, 2001), 487 
175 Addleshaw Goddard,  AFEC, Association Française d'Etude de la Concurrence; APDC Association 































                                                 
176 	Association des Avocats Pratiquant le Droit de la Concurrence White Paper response, p 12. French 
constitution of 4 October 1958 
177 Autoridade da Concorrência Portuguesa response to White Paper on damages actions 
178 The Instrument of Government, Section 11:2, as reported in FIDE 2010 country  report 
179 Reported in Truli, 801 
180  Italian Supreme Court Corte Suprema di Cassazione and 	Luxembourg Competition Authority, 
Conseil de la Concurrence and  Inspection de la Concurrence responses to the White Paper on damages 
action: Out of respect for separation of powers it is not advisable to use ‘binding’ but “présomption 


























                                                                                                                                               
181 See e.g. ‘Plans for Private Antitrust Damages Actions Directive Suffer Setback’ 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/Detail.aspx?g=71e1fd5c-7f47-40a1-9a8f-
951fe751fb5d last accessed 10.8.2012 
182 European Parliament resolution of 26 March 2009 on the White Paper on damages actions for breach 
of the EC antitrust rules (2008/2154(INI)) P6_TA(2009)0187. Objections to no legal base [2], requesting 
co-decision (now known as ordinary legislative procedure post-Lisbon) [5]. 
183 European Parliament March 2009 resolution [14] 
184 The 2012 work programme was released on 25.11.2011, available at http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/key-
documents/index_en.htm. See also Joaquín Almunia Vice President of the European Commission 
responsible for Competition Policy Work Programme for 2012 Presentation at ECON, European 
Parliament 22 November 2011, SPEECH/11/785, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/785&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en. The content of the work programme is in its annex:  
Annex to the Communication from the Commission to the European parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Commission Work 
Programme 2012 COM(2011) 777 final , Brussels, 15.11.2011 available at  




















                                                 
185 http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/forward_programming_2012.pdf (last accessed 9.8.2012) 
Commission actions expected to be adopted 18/07/2012 - 31/12/2012:.2009/COMP/023 Proposal for a 
Directive on rules governing actions for damages for infringements of the competition law provisions. 
Interestingly, the description of the legislation now opens with the sentence about the CJEU establishing 
the right to compensation, perhaps to underline its existing jurisprudential basis. 
186http://ec.europa.eu/governance/impact/planned_ia/docs/2009_comp_023_damages_breaches_antitrust_
en.pdf, last accessed 10.8.2012 
187 Commission work programme 2012 annex, 20: 2012/JUST+/017 Communication on general 
principles of the EU framework for collective redress “The potential initiative will ensure that the 
European approach to collective redress is coherent and consistent. It will be a horizontal initiative 
covering several policy areas. The aim of the initiative is to improve the enforcement of EU law and 
access to justice for citizens and companies in situations where shortcomings exist under the status quo. 
Depending on the policy option chosen, it will take the form of legislative or non-legislative action.” 
188 See for example Nederlandse Kabinet – Dutch government, including Dutch competition authority -
response to White Paper on damages actions;  European Parliament March 2009 resolution [6]. The 
Parliament adopted a further resolution in response to the Commission’s collective redress consultation 
on 2.2.2012:	European Parliament resolution of 2 February 2012 on 'Towards a Coherent European 
Approach to Collective Redress' (2011/2089(INI)) P7_TA(2012)0021, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&procnum=INI/2011/2089 (accessed 
11.8.2012). Since this resolution the Parliament’s Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee has 
commissioned an independent study, ‘Collective Redress in Antitrust’ European Parliament Directorate-
General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Economic And Scientific Policy ‘Collective Redress 
in Antitrust’ IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, PE 475.120, 12.6.2012, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=7435
1 (accessed 11.8.2012) which strongly suggests that decisions should be binding on courts (81, 90).  The 
report also proposes limiting the exposure of leniency applicants to damages claims, and requiring 
claimants to notify their claim to the relevant NCA when they begin an action in a civil court, which 
would allow, but not oblige, an NCA to intervene (14, 90). It also supports a regulation rather than a 



























                                                 
189 See C Leskinen ‘The Competence of the European Union to Adopt Measures Harmonizing the 
Procedural Rules Governing EC Antitrust Damages Action’ (2008) Working Paper Instituto de Empresa 
Law School, Madrid for a discussion of potential legal bases and  
C Leskinen ‘Antitrust Damages Actions: Recent Developments’ 
http://blogeuropa.eu/2009/05/13/antitrust-damages-actions-recent-developments/#more-503 13.5.2009 
190 “1.The Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border implications, 
based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such 
cooperation may include the adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of 
the Member States.” In particular (f): “the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil 
proceedings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the 
Member States”; (a)the mutual recognition and enforcement between Member States of judgments and of 
decisions in extrajudicial cases;  (e)effective access to justice 
191 “Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26 [ensuring the functioning of the internal market]” 




























































































































































































































































































































































                                                 
1 In a broader context, Carol Harlow has suggested that national courts should network themselves to 
come to their own idea of justice, but, interestingly, versus the CJEU. Paper presentation, ‘Cause Groups 
and Legal Accountability in EU Governance’, UACES Annual Conference, Bruges, Sep 2010. She also 
draws attention to judicial networks in other areas - C Harlow & R Rawlings ‘Promoting Accountability 
in Multi-Level Governance: A Network Approach’ (2006) European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) 

























                                                 
2 e.g. Through the Association of European Competition Law Judges (AECLJ): “a more long term 
objective of the AECLJ, (as and when funding becomes available) is the creation of a database of 
judgments in the competition law field from each of the Member States to provide a readily accessible 
body of relevant materials for Members.” http://www.aeclj.com/3587/The-work-of-the-Association.html 
(last accessed 19.9.2012) ; Oxford University Press online national competition law case-reporting 
service;  European Commission funded projects at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/call_2010_results_en.pdf (accessed 23.10.2011) including 
‘Colloquium on European competition law for judges: Implementation, 
Decentralisation, Cooperation, Consistency (I.D.C.C.) and setting-up of an internet site on 
European Competition Law (E.A.S.E. – European Antitrust-Law search engine by Sept 2013’ 
3 K Lenaerts and D Gerard ‘Decentralisation of EC Competition Law: Judges in the Frontline’ (2004) 
27(3) World Competition 313-349, 336 
4 InterActive Terminology for Europe – The EU’s multilingual term base 
http://iate.europa.eu/iatediff/SearchByQueryLoad.do?method=load (last accessed 19.9.2012) 
5 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Report on the 
functioning of Regulation 1/2003, COM (2009) 206 final 
6 In competition law, see B Rodger (ed) Article 234 and Competition Law: An Analysis (Kluwer, 2008), 
relating to pre-2004 cases. Stone Sweet suggests that under-researched questions are “to what extent does 
the law and politics of litigating European law vary across jurisdictional and national boundaries? Are 
some jurisdictions more receptive than others to enforcing E[U] law?” A-M Slaughter, A Stone Sweet & J  
Weiler (eds), The European Courts and National Courts: Doctrine and Jurisprudence (Hart, 1997) 330.  
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In	EU	law	enforcement	more	broadly,	the	diagonal	relationship	between	the	European	
Commission	and	national	courts	does	not	seem	to	have	been	researched.	Is	it	possible	to	
generalise	about	the	role	of	the	European	Commission,	given	its	historical	particular	
dominance	in	competition	enforcement?	What	about	other	EU	policy	areas?	
	
In	a	still	wider	literature	on	judicial	politics,	this	could	relate	to	research	into	the	impact	of	
amicus	curiae	interventions,	and	administrative	agencies’	interpretations	of	the	law	more	
broadly,	on	judicial	decision‐making.	
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